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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : OCI, CIA: [REDACTED], Attn: Mr. Paul Borel DATE: 17 August 1951  
FROM : Chief, Special Research Branch, PD, G-2  
SUBJECT: Analysis of the Scale and Nature of Soviet Military Assistance to the Chinese Communist Armed Forces

Attached are ten copies of a study dated 17 August 1951, subject as above, which was prepared by G-2 in co-ordination with Navy, Air, JIG and CIA, at the request of IAC.

*Joseph K. Baker*  
JOSEPH K. BAKER  
Colonel, GSC  
Chief, Special Research Branch, G-2

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Copy No. 1

Auth. by AC of S, G-2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE AC OF S, G-2  
INTELLIGENCE

Date: 17 August 1951

ANALYSIS OF THE SCALE AND NATURE  
OF  
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
TO THE  
CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES

Review of this document by CIA has  
determined that

☐ CIA has no objection to declass

☒ It contains information of CIA  
interest that must remain

classified at TS ② C

Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 13 May 81 Reviewer 6514

NOTE:-This document is to be read only by United States personnel  
officially indoctrinated and authorized to receive the information re-  
ported herein.

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Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence

Department of the Army

Washington, D. C.

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NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

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ANALYSIS OF THE SCALE AND NATURE OF SOVIET  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

To prepare a study on the scale and nature of Soviet personnel, logistical and economic support to the Chinese Communist Armed Forces.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

1. The Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Government are parties to a treaty of mutual friendship and assistance, dated 14 Feb 50, the military terms of which have not been revealed.

2. Soviet military advisers in considerable numbers have been identified in all areas of China since the conclusion of the treaty and have been active in many areas of China for more than one year.

3. On the extent of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists in Korea, [redacted] only limited evidence.

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4. There has been more evidence from all sources which indicates that substantial Soviet assistance has been given to the Chinese Communists in China and particularly in Manchuria.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Although Soviet military and economic aid to Communist China increased notably after the Chinese Communists entered the Korean conflict, the amounts noted do not indicate that Soviet aid has been of a magnitude sufficient for the Chinese to fight a full-scale prolonged war. Soviet over-all aid to Communist China in the past year appears designed for long-range development and is primarily concerned with bolstering the Chinese Communist economy with essentials unobtainable elsewhere.

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2. The known logistical support given the Chinese Communists undoubtedly represents only a portion of the whole -- the actual magnitude of Soviet support is unknown. The Chinese are being required to pay for a substantial percentage of this logistical assistance, primarily through barter agreements.

3. No insurmountable difficulties for the USSR in supplying the present scale of aid to the Chinese Communists have been apparent [redacted] nor are the Soviets and her Satellites the sole suppliers.

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4. For at least the past year, a part of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces have been undergoing a modernization, re-equipping and retraining program under Soviet jurisdiction, principally in Manchuria. This program appears to be designed to bring the combat efficiency of the Chinese Communist ground forces up to the relatively high level which existed in the North Korean forces prior to the outbreak of the Korean war, and, in addition, to provide the Chinese Communists with a commensurate air force.

5. The Chinese Communist armies that have been committed in Korea to date have not been the recipients of this retraining and re-equipping, nor have they had the benefit of full air support.

6. There is no firm evidence to substantiate the existence of an International Volunteer Force as a new and separate military body, distinguished from those forces now in the Korean-Manchurian area.

#### DISCUSSION:

##### I. SINO-SOVIET MILITARY AGREEMENTS

Since the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual alliance [redacted] there have been many accounts of uncertain reliability concerning the existence of secret military agreements between the Soviets

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and Chinese Communists. There is no concrete information concerning the terms, but the reports provide information on the purported nature and provisions of the agreements.

#### A. Ground Forces

Available evidence suggests that the Soviets have undertaken considerable responsibility for the modernization of the Chinese Communist forces.

[redacted] alleges that the Sino-Soviet plan stipulates that approximately 50 Chinese divisions are to be trained and equipped by the Soviets, while another claims that the Chinese Communist forces will eventually be reorganized to include an elite combat force of 30 divisions for tactical operations, 30 divisions for coastal defense and 50 divisions to maintain internal security. To implement this latter program, it is alleged that the Soviets will supply medium and light tanks to equip 10 tank regiments.

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It has also been alleged that the Soviets have agreed to train and equip 20 armored divisions; and another report states that the Soviets will assist in the training of, and provide arms for, 24 infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions and 1 paratroop division of Chinese troops.

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agreement was reached on 1 Oct 50 to supplement the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950. In substance, this agreement allegedly provides that the Chinese will maintain 4,500,000 combat troops in their field armies, plus a reserve of 7,000,000 troops, with all field armies following the organization of the Soviet Army. Weapons, ammunition and equipment are to be furnished by the USSR. The re-equipping of the 4,500,000 field forces is to be completed in three 3-month increments by 31 July 51.

#### B. Air Forces

[redacted] it appears that the basic agreements for Soviet aid to the CCAF were prescribed in

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the Mao-Stalin Pact of February 1950 and further clarified or augmented in November of that year. The most important provisions of the original pact apparently were: (1) The Chinese were to assign air bases in Northeast and North China to the USSR; (2) the USSR agreed initially to supply up to 800 aircraft, including 300 fighters, 140 ground attack, 100 light bombers and 260 transport and reconnaissance types; (3) the CCAF was to be reorganized with a Chinese commander but with Soviet advisers to occupy the key staff positions; (4) Soviet technical advisers should be invited to aid the CCAF.

Major provisions of the November agreement are reported to have been: (1) The USSR was to provide and maintain 770 aircraft, including 200 jets, during the period November 1950 - July 1951; (2) Soviet personnel were to pilot the aircraft until a sufficient number of Chinese pilots were available; (3) the USSR was to provide the Chinese with all equipment and technical personnel as required in the construction of military bases and airfields; (4) the Soviet Air Force was permitted to use any airfield in China.

In addition, numerous unconfirmed reports have been received indicating that supplementary military agreements have probably been reached between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The principal common features of these reports are: (a) a Soviet plan to provide substantially increased assistance to the CCAF -- reports have mentioned figures up to 3,000 aircraft; (b) a plan for Chinese Communist participation in Southeast Asian hostilities, particularly in Indo-China -- with Soviet logistical support; and (c) a provision that personnel and materiel obligations be completed by some time in the summer of 1951.

Developments since these agreements have generally appeared to conform to the terms listed above with a few

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exceptions, to wit: There has been no indication of the subjugation of the Chinese to an over-all Communist force; to date, the Chinese have only an estimated 74 Soviet transports; there is some evidence that Chinese Communists are being trained to operate jet aircraft, although the subordination of the jets is undetermined.

C. Naval Forces

[redacted] reports of Sino-Soviet agreements relating to the transfer of vessels from the Soviet to the Chinese Communist Navy. The fact that the Chinese have received Soviet small craft suggests that formal agreements have been concluded, but reliable details are not available.

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II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CCF

A. Ground Forces

In general, the Chinese Communist Forces have been composed of a heterogeneous assortment of field organizations with no consistent standardization in TO&E. The average Chinese Communist division numbers approximately 10,000 men and is armed principally with small arms of varying type and manufacture and an insignificant number of artillery pieces and armored vehicles.

The multiplicity of artillery and infantry weapons of diverse origins, models and calibers in the hands of the CCF in Korea creates complex logistical problems. Their artillery has been insufficient in quantity, and armored vehicles have been conspicuous by their absence. CCF units in contact with UN forces have also lacked technical and heavy equipment, particularly engineer construction and bridging equipment, and signal communications equipment in lower echelons. Shortage of motor transport in field units has also resulted in maldistribution of vital supplies.

The Chinese Communist munitions industry cannot produce aircraft, motor vehicles, heavy artillery and other heavy and

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technical materiel employed by modern armies. Mortar and artillery shell production in 1950 is estimated at only 5,000 rounds per day. Small arms ammunition production in early 1951 was at a rate which provided only 5 cartridges per day for each soldier in Korea. Three-fourths of the 16,000 tons of copper required for even this small production had to be imported.

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#### B. Air Forces

The CCAF would be deficient in all the requirements of an air force and would be practically non-existent without Soviet aid. The following deficiencies are confirmed: There are no aircraft or aircraft supporting industries in China; there is relatively little indigenous production of POL in China; there is a shortage of trained pilots and technicians; with the exception of the Nationalist defectors and personnel engaged in present operations, there are no combat-experienced air crews; the Chinese Communists do not have the personnel or facilities to train their personnel without outside assistance.

Despite Soviet assistance, the principal air facilities of the CCAF are vulnerable to intensive and sustained air attacks by UN aircraft. The radar, fighter and antiaircraft defense systems as now developed by the Chinese Communists for the protection of their principal air facilities probably would not be capable of effectively interfering with all-out intensive and sustained UN air attacks.

#### C. Naval Forces

Chinese Communist naval forces are presumed to be deficient in number of ships, types of ships, training and

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experience. [redacted] 50X1

[redacted] report 50X1

that a small number of coastal frigates and gunboats are possibly operational. The Chinese Communist Merchant Fleet is currently operating a number of LSM's, LST's and LCI's which are subject to recall by the Navy at any time and have been placed under Navy operation at various times in the past. A few naval auxiliaries are also believed to be operational.

### III. SOVIET PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE TO CCF

#### A. Military

##### 1. Ground Force Advisers

[redacted] indicate that approximately 5,000 Soviet "advisers" made their appearance in China within 60 days after the Sino-Soviet conference was concluded in February 1950. At present, it is estimated that at least 10,000 Soviet "advisers" are assisting the Chinese Communists in the military field alone, plus numerous others in economic, medical and governmental activities, as well as the Chinese counterpart of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB). 50X1

The entire advisory commission has been variously reported to be directed by either the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, Col Gen T. F. Shtikov, or by Lt Gen Kuzma Derevyanko, the Chief of the Military Advisory Group in China. It is considered quite probable that both officers are directly connected with the Soviet assistance program to the CCF. It is also reported that Marshal Malinowski, who is known to command all USSR Forces in the Soviet Far East, also acts as the over-all commander of Soviet activities in Korea and China.

Various reports state that an advisory group of varying size is attached to each Chinese Communist Field Army.

[redacted] there are 800 advisers attached to the 50X1

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4th Field Army. Each group has a group chief and three sections: a General Staff section, a technical section, and a training section. Members of each group are assigned as instructors in subordinate units. [REDACTED] 50X1

[REDACTED] 5,000 Soviets arrived in Hunan Province 50X1

to train Chinese Communists.

Soviet personnel are reported [REDACTED] 50X1

to be in command of paratroop training in Chiamussu, Hainan, Kaifeng, Kwelyang and Tientsin. Soviet specialists and numerous Soviet-trained Chinese personnel are reported at chemical warfare schools at Changchun and Tangshan, and Soviet radar instructors at the naval training establishment, Tsingtao, and the government radar school, Changchun. The Tunghua, Manchuria, engineer school was organized jointly by the Soviets and Chinese in 1945 with a Soviet-trained staff of Koreans and Chinese.

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## 2. Air Force Advisers

[REDACTED] report that Soviet personnel have been utilized in every phase of development of the CCAF. Military advisers reportedly occupy the key jobs at all echelons. Within Headquarters CCAF, it is believed that while Liu Ya-Lou is nominally Commander-in-Chief, in actuality Soviet advisers control the CCAF by occupying the offices of deputy commander, chief of staff, and heads of the departments controlling plans, operations and training. The same situation prevails within

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the tactical units, thus giving control of the CCAF to the Soviets. Training at all air force schools is believed to be supervised by Soviet officers and a large portion of the instructors are believed to be Soviet. Throughout China, Soviet technicians are engaged in and are believed to control airfield construction, assembly of aircraft, installation and maintenance of communications and radar, and other phases of logistical support.

[redacted] the Chinese Communist Air Force is Soviet trained and equipped. [redacted]

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### 3. Naval Forces Advisers

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[redacted] It is reported that

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the organization of the Soviet advisory group parallels that of the Chinese Communist Navy on down to the lower echelons.

Direct Soviet participation is prevalent in the Chinese Communist naval training program. It has been reported [redacted]

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[redacted] that the instructors' corps of the naval school at Tsingtao is composed entirely of Soviets.

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While it is apparent that virtually all Chinese Communist naval training is conducted or supervised by the Soviets, there is no direct evidence that the over-all training program is Soviet financed.

B. Technical

[redacted] information shows

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that Soviet technical specialists are active in the following fields: telecommunications, administration, municipal government, industry, transportation and construction of installations, such as airfields, air defense facilities, shipbuilding facilities, repair and maintenance depots and naval bases. The exact extent and nature of Soviet efforts to provide technical advisers cannot be definitely determined, but the scope of such activity is believed to be quite considerable.

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C. Direct Soviet Participation in the Combat Operations  
of CCF

Since the beginning of the Korean War, there has been an increasing number [ ] reports of uncertain reliability concerning the presence of Soviet ground units in China. An examination of the accumulated evidence provided by these reports suggests principally a probable increase in the number of Soviet military advisers in all Chinese headquarters

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and major units. In addition, an increasing number of so-called Soviet units have been reported, but they are not believed to be line combat units; they are mostly reported as antiaircraft artillery, signals, engineer and coastal artillery units. It is not certain that these units are wholly Soviet. They may well be units with a fairly large proportion of qualified Soviet personnel and some Chinese. These Chinese may be either permanently assigned to the units, or undergoing training, subsequent to which they are posted to Chinese units containing a varying number of Soviet advisers. Shipments of materiel, particularly guns and tanks delivered by Soviet instructional and maintenance personnel, may well have given rise to the large number of reports of the arrival of Soviet line divisions in China.

Soviet instructors actively participated in the supervision and instruction of air force schools. Within tactical units it is believed that Soviet personnel control all operations, supervise training, and serve as lead pilots on training flights.

With regard to Soviet participation in combat operations, the

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Soviet jet units

flying alert patrols in the Antung area.

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D. Soviet-sponsored International Volunteer Force

The existence of an International Volunteer Force is regarded as a possibility, although the available reports appear to have little foundation in fact. For the last eight months there have been [redacted] reports of the possible formation of such a force. According to some reports, it is to be employed against the UN forces in Korea. Other reports, however, claim that this force will be employed for the invasion of Japan and Formosa. The composition of the force as reported, runs the entire gamut of possibilities. For example, different reports allege that the force is composed of nationals from every Eastern European Satellite, "Mongols", Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Malays, Indonesians, Burmese and Filipinos, as well as Soviets. One report states that the force is on the front in Korea, others that it will be committed in the future. The most conservative report indicates that the International Volunteer Force is merely another name for a Soviet-sponsored tactical advisory group whose 8,000 personnel will be distributed among the North Korean and Chinese Communist tactical units opposing the UN forces. Other reports place as many as 200,000 Japanese alone within the force and that it will include as many as 400 tanks. The figure most frequently referred to is in the vicinity of 250,000 men, although a figure as high as 1½ million has been reported. None of these reports has been confirmed. The Chinese Communists themselves participate in Korean combat under the title of "Volunteers", and it is conceivable that this situation alone is the source of many

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rumors concerning an International Volunteer Force.

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In March 1951, it was reported

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that an International Volunteer Air Force was organized with headquarters at Mukden. The commander of this force reputedly is the deputy commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces, but there is no confirmation of this. Under the agreement setting up this force, it is reported that the USSR was to supply 1,400 aircraft (estimates of 3,000 have been reported, believed to include the estimated 1,000 aircraft in the CCAF/NKAF). In addition, most of the pilots were to be Soviet. Reports of "volunteer" pilots and ground crews from satellite countries and Japanese POW's have not been substantiated. It is believed that the existence of such a unit is possible and that Soviet personnel have participated in it because: (1) The reported demands of the Chinese for air support of their ground forces in Korea; (2) there are insufficient numbers of qualified Chinese pilots to engage in such support; (3) it is believed that the pilots of MIG-15's in Korea are not all Chinese; (4) the use of "volunteers" is a device of the Communists previously employed, as witness the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea and Soviet volunteers in the Spanish Civil War.

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The principal confirmed fact that emerges from reports of an International Volunteer Force in Manchuria or Korea is that the Communist air and ground forces involved in the Korean conflict are already of an international character, and, insofar as the Chinese Communists are concerned, they have a "volunteer aspect". The foreign units now committed are almost certainly contained within the existing Sino-Soviet-North Korean command framework. The assumption that they are also subordinate to a headquarters of the International Volunteer Force does not appear to be substantiated. The value of such a headquarters would appear to be largely political and psychological in that its introduction into the Korean fighting could be represented as a "popular movement of the people's democracies spontaneously going to the aid of the oppressed North Koreans". The nature of the force now committed is such that this "movement" could be effected almost by fiat. The possibility of the appearance of a Soviet-sponsored International Volunteer Force cannot therefore be overlooked, despite the fact that it is not now considered to exist as a force distinguished from the troops already committed in the Korean theater, or available in the Chinese Communist-North Korean reserves located in Manchuria.

#### IV. SOVIET LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE

##### A. Ground Forces

Information on Chinese Communist stockpiles is drawn almost entirely from [ ] CCF weapons consist largely of products of the Chinese munitions industry, materiel captured from the Nationalists and the munitions obtained from the defeated Japanese. The exact extent of this stockpile at the beginning of Chinese intervention in Korea cannot be accurately estimated. However, it has been previously concluded by G-2 that the Korean operations may already have considerably decreased this stockpile. At what point the stockpile will be

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exhausted and the CCF will require large-scale importation of munitions cannot be determined.

From the entrance of the CCF into the Korean War, no conclusive evidence has been obtained of standard issue of Soviet weapons to the CCF in Korea, <sup>1/</sup> although small quantities of such weapons captured have been of the same models which were standard issue to the NKPA as originally constituted, and in many instances these CCF units were contiguous to NKPA units in the line.

On the other hand, there is considerable evidence, including capture, that Japanese and other miscellaneous older weapons of non-Soviet origin obtained by the Soviets in Manchuria at the close of World War II were turned over to the CCF, beginning as early as 1945. Firm evidence of ordnance materiel aid to the CCF forces in China  of 50X1  
an emplaced battery of Soviet 85mm guns, M 1939, including height finder and director in Shanghai.

Although Soviet signal equipment and Soviet signal manuals printed in Chinese have been captured in Korea, direct Soviet supply of such equipment has not been definitely confirmed. There are no indications that the USSR has supplied the CCF with significant CW equipment, but it is believed that some Soviet smoke pots were employed in CCF smoke operations in the recent spring offensive.

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[redacted] reports indicate that a program of re-equipment and resupply of CCF units withdrawn from the Korean front is underway in Manchuria, North Korea and North China. Various unconfirmed reports state that Soviet tanks and artillery are arriving in Manchuria but this equipment has not as yet appeared in the Korean theater. It is quite possible that it may be destined for the reported re-equipment program. The extent of this reported program cannot be determined by currently available information.

B. Air Forces

Evidence from all sources indicates that the CCAF units are completely dependent on the USSR for logistical support. All items of supply, including spare parts and most of the current POL, are furnished by the Soviets. Logistical support in the form of airfield construction, maintenance, communications, radar, etc., have been supervised, and in some cases the work done by, Soviet personnel.

The Soviets have made available to the CCAF a total of approximately 1,000 aircraft, including about 100 aircraft of the North Korean Air Force (NKAFF), and approximately 500 aircraft (400 of which are jet fighters) of undetermined subordination, operating in coordination with the CCAF. These 1,000 aircraft, with the exception of an estimated 25 twin-engine U.S.-type transports acquired through defection from the Chinese Nationalists, consist of fighters (jet and piston), ground attack, light bomber and transport types made and furnished by the Soviets.

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[redacted] early in 1950 for the

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purpose of facilitating the delivery of a large number of aircraft to the CCAF. Aircraft types delivered included TU-2's, IL-10's, LA-9's, Soviet-type trainers, transports, and jet fighters. There was evidence that the conventional types were being turned over to the Chinese. However, this was not apparent as far as the jet aircraft were concerned. That this logistical support was not limited to aircraft was also apparent.

[redacted] shipments of POL into China, Manchuria and Korea from the USSR. The same is true for aircraft spare parts and various items of air force equipment.

### C. Naval Forces

[redacted] the following developments regarding Soviet logistical assistance to the Chinese Communist naval forces were noted:

#### 1. Vessels Transferred

At least six, and possibly as many as 12, Soviet-manufactured PT boats are operating out of Tsingtao. Reports disagree as to whether they are operated by Soviet or Chinese Communists. Despite numerous reports that the Chinese Communists are operating submarines transferred from the USSR, confirmation of this is lacking; however, Chinese crews are probably being trained aboard Soviet submarines in the Dairen area, and possibly also at Tsingtao and Yulin.

#### 2. Ordnance - Equipment

The USSR has supplied an increasing flow of ordnance material to the Chinese Communists since that regime has come to power. The Chinese Communist Navy is a miscellaneous collection of small vessels of diverse origins, and the ordnance

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equipment is a motley assortment procured from many sources.

Most of the naval ordnance equipment of the Chinese Communists is of US and Japanese World War II origin. While some stocks of spare parts and ammunition formerly purchased from the US and Japan are available from the deposed Chinese Nationalists, it has been necessary to request ordnance assistance from the USSR in order to maintain Chinese Communist naval units in a state of efficient readiness as Chinese armaments production facilities are not producing weapons for naval utilization.

It has been reported with increasing frequency that the USSR has supplied medium and heavy guns for coastal defenses (a Soviet naval responsibility) of important rivers and harbors in several areas of China. These reported gun batteries vary from 76.2mm to 150mm and above. It is certain that considerable quantities of antiaircraft guns have been shipped into vital coastal areas.

Information on shipboard ordnance has not been as plentiful as that on coastal installations; however, there is definite information available that 100mm (3.9") guns have been installed on certain Chinese gunboats and that 85mm naval guns are being accumulated at naval bases. It has also been reported that considerable quantities of automatic anti-aircraft guns of 20mm, 37mm and 40mm calibers have been stockpiled for naval use. The Chinese Communist PF (Frigate) KWANG CHOU

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[REDACTED] KWANG CHOU has probably been rearmed with 2-5.1" Soviet guns and the KAIBOKAN's have probably been rearmed with 2-3.9"/56 Soviet guns.

Fire control equipment assistance is not known, although it may be assumed that the Puazo 3 and some type of radar ranging equipment has been supplied.

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### 3. Mines

Although the Chinese have stocks of World War II Japanese mines, it has been reported that the Soviets have given additional stocks of Japanese mines to the Chinese. Although there is no confirmation of the few low evaluation reports that mines of Soviet manufacture have been supplied by the USSR, there is considerable evidence that Soviet advisers and technicians are supervising mine assembly and defensive minelaying operations along the China coast. It is expected that the Soviets will also provide the Chinese with at least the types of mines given to the North Koreans. These types include two moored contact types, the M-26 and M-RB, and one ground influence type, the R Type 1A. However, the Soviets have other types of mines which they could supply to the Chinese in quantity. These include the following: the M-08 and the M-AG, which are moored contact types laid from surface craft; the PLT and the PLT-3, also moored contact mines, but laid from submarines; the AMG-1, an aircraft laid moored contact mine; the MIRAB, a small magnetic-induction ground mine laid from surface craft; and two small river type mines called "Fishmines" which are also moored contact types. Canton and Shanghai have been named as the location of assembly and storage bases.

### 4. Torpedoes

The Chinese Communists have stocks of World War II Japanese torpedoes, both 18-inch and 21-inch. However, the Soviets can be expected to furnish the Chinese with both 18-inch and 21-inch torpedoes similar to those supplied to the North Koreans. The maximum range of these torpedoes is reported to be 4500 yards at 43 knots. (A torpedo found in Korea had a maximum range setting of approximately 15,000 yards, speed unknown). Both transverse and nose exploders are used with these torpedoes. Although no specific reports of Soviet torpedo training of Chinese

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Communist personnel have been received, it may be assumed that such training is being given in conjunction with submarine and MTB training programs believed to be underway.

5. Technical Equipment - Electronic Gear, etc.

Although specific information is limited, the known facts indicate that the Chinese Communists must be relying almost entirely upon the Soviets for technical equipment.

Soviet logistical assistance to the Chinese Communists by way of providing water-borne carriers to transport supplies to Communist China and thereby decrease the load of the Chinese Communist Merchant Fleet, which has limited facilities, has been on the increase since the end of November 1950 when Soviet merchant ships resumed voyages first to Dairen and then to other Chinese Communist ports after discontinuing such voyages at the outbreak of the Korean conflict. Since late November 1950, at least 37 Soviet merchant ships including cargo, cargo-passenger and tanker types, totalling approximately 200,000 gross tons, have been observed in the Dairen area. Many of these vessels, however, were observed to be undergoing repairs or alterations. The Soviet cargo vessel ALDAN (2,161 GT) has been making scheduled trips between Dairen and northern Chinese Communist ports since November 1950, and is believed to have been chartered by the Chinese Communists from the Soviet Union.

Since the beginning of 1951, the Soviets have used three of their Far Eastern tankers to carry petroleum products from Vladivostok to the Chinese Communist port of Tsingtao. One Soviet tanker, the SOVETSKAYA NEFT (8,288 GT) has made three such trips and the tankers BATUMI (6,236 GT) and SAKHALIN (5,124 GT) have made one each. The Soviet tanker IOSIF STALIN (7,745 GT) arrived at Tsingtao on 12 July from the Black Sea, bringing the total of Soviet petroleum products brought to Tsingtao in this manner to approximately 56,000 tons.

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The Soviet ship chartering organization SOVFRAKHT has been very active in chartering western bottoms for Chinese Communist use and for transporting supplies to Communist China from abroad. At least two tankers, the ASTER (Costa Rican, 7,053 GT) and FANTIS A (Liberian, 7,019 GT) have been chartered recently by SOVFRAKHT [redacted] for use by the Chinese Communists during the remainder of 1951. Many other western merchant ships have been similarly chartered to carry supplies from Europe to Chinese Communist ports. The Soviets are also believed to be responsible primarily for the greatly increased number of Polish ships now engaged in carrying goods to China, plus the western ships chartered by the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians which are engaged in this activity.

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[redacted] Recent railroad shipments of Soviet Naval ordnance from the Vladivostok section of the Naval Artillery Directorate [redacted] could have been for transport to either the Chinese Communist or the North Korean forces.

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#### D. Additional Logistical Information - Transportation Facilities

##### 1. Railroads

[redacted] indicate that the Soviets and Chinese Communists have been very active in the past year improving and enlarging existing railroad facilities and constructing new ones along the Sino-Soviet border. At the present time, the double-tracked Trans-Siberian Railroad must

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handle all Soviet domestic traffic in transit between European USSR and the Soviet Far East in addition to carrying all railroad shipments between the USSR and China. Two spur lines of this railroad currently are handling the major part of Sino-Soviet railroad traffic at border transshipment points located at Otpor-Manchouli (northwest corner of Manchuria) and at Grodekovo-Suifenhao or Pogranichnaya on the Manchurian border (north of Vladivostok). The Soviet single-track feeder lines to these transshipment points are 5-foot gauge, while the Manchurian lines are 4-foot, 8½ inches, thus necessitating transshipment at the border. Extensive work is being done at both places to increase facilities for reloading from one car into another. Also in existence are two less important feeder lines entering Outer Mongolia from the Soviet Union. These two lines leave the Soviet Far Eastern main line near Ulan Ude and Borzaya and terminate at the Outer Mongolian cities of Ulan Bator and Choj Balsan (Bayan Tumen) respectively. There is some evidence that work is being carried on which will eventually connect these two cities by railroad. Also improvements are currently being made on the Borzaya-Choj Balsan line which is operated by the Soviets as part of their Far Eastern railroad system.

Two relatively short feeder lines leave the Soviet Far Eastern main line near the northern border of Manchuria at Kuibyshevka and Bireya for the Amur River ports of Blagoveshchensk and Poyarkovo. Indications are that the Chinese are currently extending a line to meet the Soviet line across the river from Blagoveshchensk. These two Amur ports are also currently available for transshipping Soviet supplies to river vessels for transport on the Amur River and the Sungari River into Manchuria as far as Harbin, thus relieving railroad congestion at points further east. The Soviet Far Eastern main

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line crosses the Amur at Khabarovsk and goes south to Vladivostok. In addition to the major transshipment point in this section at Grodekovo-Suifengho noted above, another spurline goes to the Manchurian border at Iman, to which the Chinese are completing or have completed a connecting line.

Railroad facilities going east from Vladivostok to the port of Nakhodka are being improved and will facilitate handling the anticipated increase in shipments being carried by sea between the two countries. In addition, the Soviets have completed a line from Vladivostok south through Kraskino to connect with the North Korean railroad system.

The Soviets and the Chinese are also planning other railroad projects which, when completed, would greatly improve their respective logistical capabilities for moving supplies from one country to another. Some construction work is believed underway on the proposed railway to connect Central China with Soviet Kazakh SSR. In late 1950, the Chinese Railroad Constructing Bureau was at work on the line extending westward to Lanchow [redacted] while the Soviets reportedly were working on a line extending eastward from the USSR Turkish-Siberian line to Tihwa. Completion of such a line to connect Tihwa and Lanchow would be a major construction job, possibly requiring years of extensive effort and large quantities of materiel; however, if accomplished, this railroad line would alleviate the present bottleneck of railroad shipments which must now enter China through Manchuria and would also aid Soviet efforts to exploit Western China's resources. The Soviets are still engaged in the construction of an alternate route to the Trans-Siberian which would run north of Lake Baikal from Taishet to Komsomolsk. This line would augment the existing rail facilities in the Soviet Far East, but the expected date of completion of this route is not known.

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## 2. Inland Waterways

The newly established inland waterway system between China and the Soviet Union via the Amur-Sungari Rivers is currently increasing in importance as a method of transporting Soviet supplies into Manchuria. The Soviets are now definitely utilizing this route for effecting shipments of petroleum products into Manchuria as far as Harbin. The use of this system for effecting transport will ease the burden on Soviet Far Eastern railroads and the Chinese Manchurian railroads. This system, however, is not available for use during the winter months. It was recently reported that the Chinese Communist Sungari port of Harbin was enlarging its marine construction and repair facilities ostensibly for the purpose of increasing shipping capabilities on this waterway. The Soviet Amur ports of Blagoveschensk, Poyarkovo and Khabarovsk appear to be Soviet transshipment ports and the Chinese ports of Harbin and Chiamussu the important Chinese centers for this new activity.

## 3. Civil Air Fleet

The Soviets also have established three Civil Air routes into China and are operating a Civil Air Line in North China and Manchuria along these routes which assists in maintaining logistical support of the Chinese Communist Air Force. These three civil air routes were established in late 1949 and originate at Alma Ata, Irkutsk and Chita in the Soviet Union and terminate at Peking. Stop-over points are maintained along all three routes, particularly along the route from Chita through Manchuria to Peking. This Soviet-operated civil air activity is called the Sino-Soviet Aviation Joint Stock Company, but is entirely Soviet controlled and operated.

## V. SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

[redacted] that trade between Communist China and the USSR has steadily developed since April

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1950 as a result of the Goods Exchange Agreement of 19 April 1950 and the contracts concluded on that date and in October 1950.

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The commodity

categories of Soviet exports to China include (a) chemicals, drugs and laboratory equipment; (b) communications, power and electrical equipment; (c) machinery and machine tools; (d) transportation equipment; (e) petroleum products; (f) semi-processed iron and steel products; (g) foods; and (h) probably armaments. Technical assistance also may be classified as an important Soviet export category. Thus the basic pattern of Sino-Soviet trade is Chinese raw materials in exchange for Soviet-manufactured products and industrial equipment.

Soviet exports to China during this period, while greatly increased over past years, still represented only partial fulfillment of China's requirements. In comparison to Soviet shipment to China of possibly \$218,000,000 worth of goods (\$131 million arbitrarily projected on a basis of about 60% coverage) during the 12-month period, Chinese purchases from Hong Kong alone averaged \$42,500,000 per month for the first quarter of 1951. In addition to this, China has carried on substantial trade with the rest of the world, including the United States and Japan until December 1950.

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As previously noted, it is believed that the figures above represent exchange only under the Goods Exchange Agreement of 19 April 1950. On 14 February 1950, another agreement was signed wherein the Soviets extended a 300 million dollar credit to the Chinese for heavy industrial and capital equipment. Shipments under this were calculated to average \$60 million annually for five years.

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have noted that a separate arms

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agreement between China and the USSR was also concluded.

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#### VI. INDICATIONS OF GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET MATERIEL ASSISTANCE AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF

##### A. Korea

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there are indications that

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Soviet-equipped Chinese Communist armored units have moved into North Korea.

##### B. Manchuria

Soviet efforts to strengthen Chinese Communist ground forces by furnishing mechanized equipment and modern weapons to forces in Manchuria have been reported with increasing frequency. These reports suggest that certain Chinese Communist units in Manchuria may already have been equipped with standard Soviet weapons and equipment comparable to that given the North Koreans.

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More than 400 jet fighter aircraft of MIG-15, MIG-9 and YAK-15 types have been made available to the CCAF.

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[redacted] large

quantities of Soviet petroleum products are being shipped into Manchuria. In all probability, the majority of all Soviet goods comes into Manchuria. This does not mean that it is all being used there, because there is evidence that Manchuria is the transshipment point for most of these goods. Manchouli, on the Soviet-Manchurian border, is a large rail transshipment point, as is Shenyang. Dairen and Yinkow are identified as large transshipment ports for petroleum products. Certain amounts of these products are used in Manchuria, and in all probability certain amounts go to the Chinese Armed Forces in Korea.

C. North China

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Tsingtao is the distribution point for petroleum products from the USSR for Central and South China. It is also a storage area and probably the distribution point for the rest of North China. There is also some evidence of tankers arriving at the port of Tientsin.

D. Central China

Shanghai is usually considered as the focal point for Chinese foreign trade. It is the transshipment point for Central China because of its location at the mouth of the Yangtze River. There is evidence [redacted] that Soviet tires, machine tools and petroleum products are sent into Shanghai for use in that area or for transshipment up the Yangtze River.

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E. South China

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there is considerable evidence

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[redacted] of the

movement of arms, munitions and some industrial material into this area. Implications of shipment of Soviet arms into South China could be many, but they can be broken down into four rough categories: (i) for use in the invasion of Taiwan; (ii) for use in the Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-China and Burma; (iii) for use in supplying the needs of Viet Minh; (iv) for use in the defense against Chinese Nationalist or American landings.

F. Western China

[redacted] areas

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of China adjacent to the Soviet border are receiving a great deal of Soviet attention. In northwestern China, two of the Soviet civil air routes terminating at Peking cross through this area. The Soviets, in addition, maintain a widespread net of heavily staffed consulates throughout northwest China, through which Soviet activities appear to be coordinated. The USSR Consulate General in this area is located at Urumchi

[redacted] and there are other consulates at

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Kashgar

Chuguchak

Kuldja

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[redacted] and Sharasume

The business

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of supplying most of this territory's economic needs including petroleum supplies and transport equipment and also of exploiting the territory's resources appears to be in Soviet hands.

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